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When Rights Fall in a Forest . . The
Ker-Frisbie Doctrine and American
Judicial Countenance of Extraterritorial
Abductions and Torture
I. Introduction
On August 10, 1990 a federal judge in Los Angeles made a
ruling which shocked the government and called into question signifi-
cant aspects of current American executive policies. Judge Edward
Rafeedie of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California held that the abduction' of a Mexican National by
paid agents of the United States violated a valid extradition treaty
between the United States and Mexico.2 Judge Rafeedie also held
that an objection by a foreign government to a violation of an extra-
dition treaty between the United States and that foreign government
precludes jurisdiction by American Courts. Invoking a seldom used
exception to the one hundred year-old Ker-Frisbie doctrine, Judge
Rafeedie ordered the Mexican National released.
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is the American formulation of the
Roman maxim 'male captus, bene detentus', which says that an ille-
gal apprehension will not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction.3
Though the sweeping judicial acceptance of irregular apprehensions
of persons wanted for criminal prosecution tolerated by Ker-Frisbie
has been long and roundly criticized," the doctrine continues to be
I. Though some commentators describe this phenomenon as an "extralegal" abduction,
because the act of the abduction inevitably violates the domestic law of the asylum state, this
Comment will refer to the abduction of Dr. Alvarez and other criminal defendants as an illegal
abduction. The terms "abduction" and "kidnapping" will be used interchangeably.
2. 'Under article 9(2) of the Treaty of Extradition, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico,
31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, if an extradition request is refused, "the requested Party
shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that
the Party has jurisdiction over the offense."
3. See Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to
Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25, 45, (1973) for the argument that male captus,
bene detentus is superceded by two higher maxims of Roman Law; nunquam decurritur ad
extraordinarium sed ubi deficit ordinarium ("never resort to the extraordinary until the ordi-
nary fails") and ex injuria ius non oritur i("no right can arise from the violation of law").
4. See Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, Continued 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, (1990); Williams, Criminal Law - Jurisdiction -
Illegal Arrest - Due Process Violation of International Law, 53 CAN. BAR REV. 404 (1981),
Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over Fugitives Brought From A Foreign Coun-
try by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32 IND. L.J. 265 (1952)(hereinafter Garcia-
Mora), Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law,
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utilized in securing American jurisdiction over accused drug traffick-
ers,5 terrorists, 6 and an occasional Florida land salesman.7
This Comment reviews the theories of dismissal which were
available to Judge Rafeedie and analyzes the theory he chose. To
understand the Judge's reasoning, Part One relates the facts of the
abduction of the Mexican National, Dr. Humberto Alvarez
Machain. Part Two describes the history of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine
and its exceptions, and evaluates them in light of the state-action
analysis traditionally used in "domestic" American constitutional
law. Part Three goes on to describe alternative theories, rejected by
Judge Rafeedie, which more resolutely denounce international ab-
ductions and torture. The Comment observes that Judge Rafeedie's
reasoning emphasized U.S. treaty obligations over international law
and human rights. The Comment concludes by suggesting that the
Ker-Frisbie doctrine has outlived its use and only serves to en-
courage circumvention of the very laws courts are bound to uphold.
II. The Abduction
On February 7, 1985, DEA agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena
was kidnapped in Mexico.8 A month later his mutilated body was
found sixty miles outside of Guadalajara." Investigations suggested
that Camarena had been killed in retaliation for exposing illegal im-
portation of marijuana from Mexico to the United States.10 A prom-
inent Guadalajara- physician, Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain, was
alleged to have administered drugs to Camarena to keep him alive
during the torture and interrogation which preceded his death." The
United States wanted to prosecute Dr. Alvarez for his alleged com-
plicity in the torture and murder of Agent Camarena.12
On April 2, 1990, Dr. Alvarez was kidnapped at gunpoint in his
28 AM. J. INTL L. 231, 238 (1934).
5. Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a citizen and resident of Honduras, under indict-
ment on various narcotics charges in California and Arizona, was kidnapped in front of his
home in Tegucigalpa, Honduras on April 5, 1988. Among other abuses, Matta alleged he had
been shocked with electric devices repeatedly during his kidnapping and interrogation.
Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 447.
6. Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese citizen wanted for the hijacking of a Jordanian airplane,
was lured onto a yacht in the Mediterranean Sea, kidnapped, and transported to the United
States. Yunis suffered a broken arm during the abduction. Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 444-46.
7. Sidney Jaffee was wanted for unlawful land sales practices, as well as for failure to
appear in court, and was seized on the street in front of his home in Canada by American
bounty-hunters on September 23, 1981. See Lewis, Unlawful Arrest: A Bar to the Jurisdiction
of the Court, or Male Captus, Bene Detentus? Sidney Jaffe: A Case in Point, 28 CRIM. L.Q.
341, 353-56 (1985).
8. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
9. Id. at 601-02.
10. Id. at 603 n.6.
11. Lowenfeld, Kidnapping by Government Order: A Follow-Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712
(1990).
12. Chicago Tribune, Feb. 1, 1990, at 6, col.I.
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office in Guadalajara by men displaying badges of the Federal Police
of Mexico. 13 The next day, Dr. Alverez was delivered to DEA agents
in Texas. At trial, Alvarez alleged that during his captivity he was
beaten, drugged, and shocked on the soles of his feet with an electri-
cal apparatus."' Although Alvarez had complained of chest pains to
a physician in the United States, he did not mention any abusive
treatment as a possible cause of those symptoms. 5 Judge Rafeedie,
reasoning that a man trained in medicine would surely volunteer' all
relevant information to an attending physician, ultimately rejected
Alvarez's allegations of mistreatment.'"
Judge Rafeedie found that an informant had advised the DEA
in December of 1989 that Mexican Federal Judicial Police
(MFJP)' 7 Comandante Jorge Castillo del Rey wanted to discuss a
possible exchange of fugitives with the United States.' 8 Castillo del
Rey and another, unidentified, commandante met with DEA agents
Berellez and Waters in Los Angeles on December 13, 1989."9 The
Mexican officials informed the DEA agents that they were working
with the knowledge of the chief of the MFJP fugitive detail, and the
Mexican Attorney General. They agreed that in return for the
DEA's investigation of the immigration status of a Mexican Na-
tional wanted for the theft of large sums of money, the MFJP would
deliver Dr. Humberto Alvarez Machain to the DEA.20 Four weeks
later the MFJP asked for $50,000, in advance, to cover the cost of
transporting Alvarez to the United States.2' The DEA refused to
front any money and the deal never materialized.22
Two months later the original informant contacted the DEA
with the news that he and his associates were ready to deliver Alva-
rez. Changing its mind, the DEA promised to pay the $50,000, plus
expenses, in exchange for the delivery of Dr. Alvarez to custody in
the United States. This time however, the informant represented not
the official Mexican Police, but a group of civilians, and current and
ex-police officers.2" Some of the kidnappers received money immedi-
13. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 603.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 604.
16.. Id. at 605. For a discussion of the difficulty of proving allegations of torture and
mistreatment in international kidnapping cases, see, Lowenfeld, supra note 4, at 470, 489.
Toscanino, whose case fostered the shocking to the conscience exception, himself could not
prove torture. Professor Lowenfeld points out that this was not surprising as Toscanino was
blindfolded at all relevant times. In the absence of third-party witnesses, torture by electric
shocks is very hard to prove as such devices seldom leave any physical evidence.
17. The MFJP enjoys powers and performs functions similar to the F.B.I.
18. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 603.
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ately, were then granted- entry to the United States, and are cur-
rently being supported, along with their families, at a cost of $6,000
per week. 4 Other of the kidnappers have been apprehended by the
Mexican Police and now face trial in Mexico on cha'rges of kidnap-
ping.2" The Mexican Government currently seeks extradition of not
only the Mexican kidnappers, but the DEA agents who offered the
money for delivery of Dr. Alvarez. 6 The incident has generated sub-
stantial tension in Mexican-American relations.27 Mexico has sug-
gested that it may respond in kind, and send its own agents into the
United States to apprehend persons wanted for crimes in Mexico.2"
Judge Rafeedie considered four theories submitted as bases for
Dr. Alvarez's motion to dismiss the prosecution against him: 1) that
Alvarez was deprived of due process of law; 9 2) that Alvarez's pres-
ence in the court was obtained in violation of an existing treaty be-
tween the United States and Mexico; 30 3) that Alvarez's presence
was obtained in violation of the terms of the Charters of the United,
Nations and The Organization of American States; 31 and, 4) that
the court should dismiss the action as an exercise of its supervisory
power. 32 The Government relied on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to rebut
all these theories.
Ultimately, Judge Rafeedie dismissed the case based upon a
finding that paid agents of the United States had violated a valid
extradition treaty in force between the United States and Mexico. It
was the first time that the violation of an extradition treaty exception
has been applied to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in over sixty years. Dr.
Alvarez remains in jail without bond, awaiting the outcome of the
Government's appeal.
III. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
A. The Standing of Non-Resident Aliens to Raise Exceptions to
the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine in United States Courts
For over one-hundred years, the Ker-Frisbie doctrine has been
successfully invoked to uphold jurisdiction where criminal defend-
24. Lowenfeld, supra note I1, at 714.
25. Rohter, Mexico Arrests Six in Abduction Case, The New York Times, Apr. 29,
1990, sec.1, pt.l, at 9, col. 1.
26. Reuters, May 26, 1990, AM cycle.
27. The Washington Times, May 22, 1990, at A3, col.2. Substantial tension has been
generated between the United States and other Latin American Nations as well. See, Debus-
mann, Latin Americans View U.S. Drug Agents with Increased Suspicion, Reuters, May 20,
1990, BC Cycle.
28. The Washington Post, June 30, 1990, at A25, col. 6.
29. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 604 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
30. Id. at 609.
31. Id. at 614.
32. Id. at 615.
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ants have been illegally brought before courts. The Supreme Court
first addressed this question of government-sanctioned kidnapping in
1886, in Ker v. Illinois.3 Ker was wanted in Illinois for embezzling
money from a Chicago bank. 3" The bank discovered that Ker was
living in Peru, obtained the necessary extradition papers, 35 and hired
a Pinkerton agent to accept Ker from the Peruvian Government and
transport him back to Chicago. But Chilean forces occupied Lima at
that time, and the Peruvian Government was in exile. Formal extra-
dition proceedings were therefore difficult and the Pinkerton agent
"without presenting [the papers] to any officer of the Peruvian gov-
ernment, or making any demand on that government for the surren-
der of Ker, forcibly and with violence arrested him . . ."I'
Ker objected to his prosecution in the United States on the
ground that his right to due process had been violated by the illegal
arrest. While the United States Supreme Court conceded that Ker
had been kidnapped, 37 it held that the purpose of due process lay in
fair trials, and that an illegal abduction would not preclude jurisdic-
tion so long as the indictment was proper and a fair trial ensued. 38
Sixty-six years later, in Frisbie v. Collins, Ker was reaffirmed as due
process claims were again limited to the constitutionally guaranteed
right to a fair trial.3 9 Frisbie had been illegally apprehended in Illi-
nois by Michigan law enforcement officials. The Court cited Ker as
authority for the proposition that the means of apprehension do not
invalidate the ends of prosecution, extended the principle to illegal
arrests within the United States, and enunciated the Ker-Frisbie
Rule.
The same day it decided Ker, the Court decided United States
v. Rauscher.'0 Rauscher had been extradited from Great Britain on
charges of murder, but was tried instead on a lesser offense. In Rau-
scher the Court enunciated the concept of specialty to support its
dismissal of Rauscher's case. Specialty holds that if an extradition
treaty is in force and is used to return an alleged criminal to a de-
manding state, and the demanding state tries that person for an of-
fense other than that for which he was extradited, then that is a
violation of the treaty and jurisdiction is thereby precluded."' Spe-
cialty is invokable by citizens and need not be raised by a govern-
33. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
34. Id. at 438.
35. The extradition papers were in accord with the treaty then in force between the U.S.
and Peru, Sept. 12, 1870, 18 Stat. 719, 10 Bevans 1052 (entered into force July 27, 1884).
36. Ker, 119 U.S. at 438.
37. Id. at 439.
38. Id. at 440.
39. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, (1952).
40. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, (1886).
41. Id. at 430.
Spring 199 1 ]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ment.42 Although extradition treaties were present in both Rauscher
and Ker, only Rauscher was found to have standing to invoke a
treaty violation as a defense to prosecution. Edwin Dickinson, a
respected commentator, analyzing Rauscher fifty years after the de-
cision, wrote:
While it is conceded that the individual, as such, has no right of
asylum in the foreign state, his objection to the jurisdiction
serves as a foil to remind the court of the nation's international
obligation. Although his claim to exemption from further prose-
cution may be without moral foundation, the individual is per-
mitted to make an issue of the right of the state from which he
was surrendered to have the extradition treaty respected.' 3
Conversely, in Ker the Court held that a citizen may not invoke
an extradition treaty to preclude jurisdiction where an illegal abduc-
tion was not made under the pretenses of that treaty. The Court said
that "[t]he right of the government of Peru to give a party in Ker's
condition an asylum in that country is quite a different thing from
the right in him to demand and insist upon such an asylum."' 4
While not enunciating the principle, the language suggests that Peru
had a right to object to Ker's abduction, if it had chosen to do so.
The Ker Court did not specifically consider whether an objection by
an asylum state to an illegal abduction carried out in derogation of
an existing extradition treaty would invest the abductee with the
right to invoke the treaty and preclude subsequent prosecution in the
United States. Thus, though Rauscher had standing as a "foil" to
remind the government of its treaty obligations, Ker did not.
One rationale used in harmonizing Ker and Rauscher is that a
violation of an extradition treaty may only occur when the treaty is
utilized. 46 That rationale has been used in recent years to maintain
jurisdiction where an apprehension has violated an extradition treaty
but the offended nation has not objected.' 6 According to the ration-
ale, the fact of an extradition treaty's existence, accompanied by evi-
dence of its violation is not enough to divest a court of jurisdiction. If
the offended sovereign does not object, the offended citizen has no
standing to object.47 In United States v. Reed,"8 the court rejected
42. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 613 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
43. Dickinson, supra note 4, at 232, quoted in Lewis, supra note 4, at 348.
44. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 445 (1886).
45. Lewis, supra note 7, at 348. Ms. Lewis writes: "This distinction is not capable of
rational justification and smacks of sophistry." But see, United States v. Najohn, 785 F. 2d
1420 (9th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1009 (1986).
46. See United States v. Valot, F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980); Stevenson v. United
States, 381 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1967).
47. United States v. Caro-Quintero 745 F. Supp. 599, 608. (C.D. Cal. 1990). While
recognizing a split in the jurisdictions over the question of standing of non-resident aliens to
raise due process claims in United States courts, Judge Rafeedie held that it is for the offended
[Vol. 9:2
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Reed's attempt to invoke an extradition treaty between the U.S. and
the Bahamas. The court found that "absent protest or objection by
the offended sovereign, Reed has no standing to raise violation of
international law as an issue. ' 9
B. The Toscanino Exception to the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
Independent of an objecting asylum state, individual standing to
raise objections to a criminal prosecution where a defendant's pres-
ence has been obtained through an illegal abduction is only available
where outrageous governmental conduct has occurred. In United
States v. Toscanino,0 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit limited the Ker-Frisbie doctrine to situations where
kidnappings are not "shocking to the conscience." The undeniably
shocking quality of Toscanino lay not only in the length and severity
of the alleged torture and interrogation of Toscanino by paid agents
of the U.S. government, but also in the presence of U.S. officials
during some of the torture and interrogations. 51
It is an unfortunately narrow and indefinite exception. Cases
following Toscanino found tortured defendants to be triable, so long
as there was no official U.S. involvement. As Judge Rafeedie formu-
lated it, the rationale has been that protections of the Bill of Rights
apply only to State action. Foreign governments are thus in a posi-
tion analogous to private parties, whose independent activities are
not circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment.52
Courts have stayed the course of Ker-Frisbie through somewhat
rocky waters. In United States v. Lara,53 the defendant was blind-
folded, beaten, strapped nude to a box-spring, tortured with electric
shocks, and questioned by Chilean police about the whereabouts of
an alleged co-conspirator. Because Toscanino was based on shocking
governmental conduct, it was not found to be applicable. Because the
Court of Appeals found no evidence that representatives of the
United States participated in or acquiesced to the alleged torture,
state and not the offended individual to object to a kidnapping which violates an extradition
treaty.
48. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 902.
50. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) reh'g denied, 504 F.2d
1380 (1974).
51. Lowenfeld, supra note 4 at 467. Toscanino, a citizen of Italy residing in Uruguay,
was abducted there and "was brought to Brasilia where he was interrogated and tortured for
17 days in the presence and with the participation of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics. [He] was
given nourishment intravenously in just the amount needed to keep him alive; and so on ...
with details of fingers pinched with metal pliers, alcohol flushed into his eyes and nose, and
electrodes attached to his earlobes, toes and genitals."
52. See Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, sec. 18-1, at 1688-89 (2d ed. 1988).
53. United States V. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 432 U.S. 847
(1975).
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jurisdiction was held to be proper.54 Though the U.S. had set the
events in motion by requesting Lara's apprehension and delivery, the
court did not charge the brutal conduct to the U.S. Government . 5
Jurisdiction has also been upheld where the U.S. Government
has been found to have been involved in an illegal abduction, but
there have been no allegations of torture. In United States ex rel
Lujan v. Gengler,56 the Second Circuit held that application of the
"shocking to the conscience" exception which had been enunciated
in Toscanino was limited to "shocking governmental conduct. '57
Mere governmental kidnapping, without allegations of torture, was
not considered shocking to the conscience. Various other United
States-initiated kidnappings have produced allegations of torture.
The Toscanino "shocking to the conscience" exception has been so
narrowly construed, however, that no defendant since has been af-
forded its protection against torture.58
Judge Rafeedie rejected Dr. Alvarez's attempt to invoke viola-
tion of due process under the Toscanino exception. 59 Even if taken as
true, Judge Rafeedie held that Dr. Alvarez's allegations of mistreat-
ment did not rise to the level of barbarism necessary to invoke
Toscanino. 0
C. The Disparate Constitutional Visions of the Ker-Frisbie Doc-
trine and the Toscanino Exception
The due process arguments advanced by the defense concerning
Dr. Alvarez's attempt to invoke the Toscanino exception, and the
government's arguments against its application, represent different
conceptions of the United States Constitution. Relying on the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine, the Government denied that Alvarez had standing
to invoke constitutional due process claims based upon the miscon-
duct of paid U.S. agents. The defense contended that Alvarez did
have standing because the Constitution limits acts of the Govern-
ment and its agents to objectively constitutional conduct.
It may be said that the Government's position is a contractarian
analysis of the United States Constitution, and that the position of
54. Id. at 70.
55. Id. at 71, The court said, "since our government has no control over the foreign
police, extension of the Toscanino doctrine would serve no purpose."
56. United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001 (1975).
57. Id. at 66.
58. In a recent case, Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros alleged he had been kidnapped at
gunpoint, severely beaten, and burned by electric devices before arriving in the United States.
Mr. Matta was denied any protection afforded by the Toscanino doctrine. Matta-Ballesteros
ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 261 (7th Cir. 1990).
59. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 606 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
60. ld. at 605.
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the defense is an organic scheme. 61 The government's position is that
the Constitution is a social contract between the government and the
citizenry. This contractarian view terms the Constitution "a compact
between the people of the United States and its government, creating
enforceable rights and duties running between each of the parties." '
Thus, constitutional rights pertain exclusively to "We, the People."
In this view limitations placed upon governmental action in the
United States do not extend when the government acts abroad and
upon non-citizens of the United States.63
The organic view believes that the Constitution, having created
the branches of government, thereby limits their operation to objec-
tively constitutional terms. In this view government officials are
bound by constitutional standards of conduct whenever and wherever
they operate in the name of the government."' "The extra-territorial
reach [of the Bill of Rights] is coextensive with the protections they
guarantee within U.S. territory. Thus the fourth and fifth amend-
ments curb the search, seizure, and interrogation powers of U.S. offi-
cials abroad, even where the object of that protection is not a U.S.
citizen."6 5 In contrast to the contractarian view, which protects only
Americans, and foreigners located within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, the organic view 'potentially entitles anyone
injured by United States officials - American or alien - to Constitu-
tional redress." 6
There is some Supreme Court support for an organic vision of
61. These terms are adapted from Note, The Extraterritorial Applicability of the
Fourth Amendment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1672 (1989), which argues that both organic and
contractarian views provide unconvincing standards for the extraterritorial appplicability of the
Constitution. The note suggests that the judiciary nonetheless should in some way oversee
conduct of American officials abroad.
62. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCING UNITED STATES LAW IN
THE WORLD COMMUNITY 43 (Fourth Sokol Colloquium, R. Lillich ed. 1981). Professor Ste-
phan of the University of Virginia School of Law believes that the executive should be free to
engage in irregular (unconstitutional) conduct abroad when it is deemed necessary to protect
U.S. interests. Professor Stephan argues further that such conduct abroad will not infect do-
mestic government behavior. However, Professor Rochow points out that Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, (1960), discusses the "'frustration of state policy which occurs when a
federal court admits evidence lawlessly obtained by state agents." She suggests that "'tolerance
in a federal forum infects state agent behavior in the state context as well," noting that other-
wise, there would be no frustration of state policy. Rochow, Book Review, 6 B.C. INT'L & C. L.
REV. 637, 642 (1983).
63. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) "[A]ll persons within the
United States are entitled to the protection afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments." Yick
Wo v: Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1888) ("The Fourteenth Amendment . . . is not confined
to the protection of citizens . . . [Its] provisons are universal in their application to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.)"
64. Saltzberg, The Reach of the Bill of Rights beyond the Terra Firma of the United
States, 20 VA. J. INT'L. L. 741 (1980).
65. Id. at 747. The organic perspective has been criticized as an overly expansive view of
the Constitution and having the effect of creating "a virtual free-floating source of law". See,
Note, supra note 62, at 1672.
66. Id. at 1675.
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the Constitution. In Balzac v. Porto Rico,6 7 the Court said that "the
Constitution of the United States is in force wherever and whenever
the sovereign power of that government is exerted. ' 8 Courts in Reid
v. Covert,"9 and Best v. United States,70 both reasoned that the
United States is bound by the Bill of Rights wherever it acts.71 Tos-
canino, as well, though traditionally seen as an affirmation of due
process standards, may be seen to have been based upon an organic
view of the Constitution as Toscanino was an Italian citizen residing
in Argentina and would have had no claim to Constitutional protec-
tion under a strict contractarian analysis.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court most recently held in
U.S. v. Verdugo-Urquidez,72 that evidence seized by U.S. officials in
violation of the Fourth Amendment may be admitted into evidence if
the seizure is made abroad. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority in a 5-4 decision, used contractarian language to hold that
"the people protected by the Fourth Amendment ... refers to a
class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be con-
sidered part of that community." 73 Although both contractarian and
organic perspectives have been endorsed by the Court, in the context
of extraterritorial abductions of non-resident aliens by the United
States or its agents, the current Court may not be expected to re-
spect due process claims. 74 In light of Verdugo-Urquidez, the future
of any due-process based Toscanino exceptions is doubtful. If
"shocking to the conscience" exceptions to U.S.-sponsored kidnap-
ping are to survive, an organic constitutional vision must control fu-
ture cases.75
67. Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
68. See, e.g. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc) ("All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the
law, and are bound to obey it.") (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218 (1882).
69. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
70. Best v. United States, 184 F.2d 131, 138 (1st Cir. 1950).
71. See, United States v. Birdsell, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1965), where the court ac-
knowledged organic constitutional reasoning but found it inapplicable to action by foreign sov-
ereigns in their own countries.
72. United States v. Verdugo Urquidez, I10 S.Ct. 1056 (1990).
73. Id. at 1061. One might wonder what sort of non-resident alien connections with the
United States will suffice in future cases to limit official U.S. conduct. For example, would
Mick Jagger, if his home in England were to be searched by U.S. officials, be afforded Fourth
Amendment protection? He does regular business within our borders and is revered by millions
of Americans. The logical outcome of the "national community" standard for rightholders will
inevitably be that non-resident aliens of means may be afforded Constitutional protection,
while less wealthy and less well-traveled non-resident aliens will not.
74. It is interesting to ponder, in light of Verdugo Urquidez, whether the Toscanino
exception is still good law. If Fourth Amendment defenses are not invokeable by non-resident
aliens, it is doubtful that Fifth Amendment due process defenses will be available.
75. Courts use the doctrine of supervisory power to justify their intervention in cases
which are "shocking to the conscience." See discussion infra, notes 107, 129-41.
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D. The Violation of an Extradition Treaty Exception to the Ker-
Frisbie Doctrine
Judge Rafeedie found the Ker-Frisbie doctrine inapplicable to
Dr. Alvarez because Mexico had satisfactorily objected to the U.S.
Government's violation of the extradition treaty.76 Indeed, in connec-
tion with the appeal which is pending at this writing, the Govern-
ment of Mexico has submitted a formal letter protesting the abduc-
tion to the court. In the letter the Mexican Consul General asks the
Court of Appeals to uphold Judge Rafeedie's decision since to over-
rule it would serve to encourage other illegal abductions. 77
The violation of an extradition treaty exception to the Ker-Fris-
bie doctrine has its roots in Rauscher, where deviations from the bill
of extradition, protested by England, frustrated the Government's re-
quest for jurisdiction in U.S. courts and caused the Supreme Court
to enunciate the doctrine of specialty. Judge Rafeedie explained in
his opinion that Dr. Alvarez enjoyed a derivative standing because
Mexico had protested by rights held under the extradition treaty.7 8
The violation of an extradition treaty exception is based upon
Article VI of the United States Constitution which states that "trea-
ties are the supreme law of the land."7 9 Consequently, "a treaty
must be accorded priority when it is in conflict with the aims of gov-
ernment".8" While not all treaties enjoy that status, those which are
self-executing do.81 Other treaties, considered executory (requiring
implementing legislation by Congress), are not accorded such status
and may not be invoked to preclude jurisdiction.82 Extradition trea-
ties are deemed self-executing by their very nature and are binding
without implementing legislation.83
Judge Rafeedie cited Ford v. United States,84 Cook v. United
States,8" and United States v. Ferris86 as authority for his holding
that where a violation of an extradition treaty of the United States is
involved Ker-Frisbie is inapplicable.87 Both Ford and Cook dealt
with the United States' obligation to respect search and seizure pro-
visions of treaties treating the status of English ships off American
76. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 606, (C.D. Cal. 1990).
77. The Los Angeles Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at B3, col. 5.
78. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 608.
79. U.S. CONST, art. VI, cl. 2.
80. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 607-08.
81. Id. at 606-07.
82. Id. at 606-07.
83. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE, Ch.
2. § 4.1, at 71-72, § 4.2, at 74 (2d ed. 1987).
84. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927).
85. Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
86. United States v. Ferris, 19 F.2d 925 (N.D. Cal. 1927).
87. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 606-07 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
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territorial waters. In response to increased smuggling of liquor into
the United States during Prohibition, England and the United States
had agreed to extend U.S. jurisdiction beyond normal territorial
water limits. Searches of English ships however were limited to spe-
cific instances and specific procedures. Because of U.S. violation of
those procedures and England's objections, Cook and Ford were al-
lowed derivative standing to protest the illegal searches and seizures
in each of their cases even though Ker had stood for forty years.
Judge Rafeedie also cited Toscanino, which based its holding on
due process standards, but which also mentioned the fact that Ar-
gentina had protested the kidnapping under right of a valid treaty.
Due process standards were not found to be implicated in Dr. Alva-
rez's abduction because the alleged torture involved did not rise to
the level of Toscanino, and thus was excusable. However, because
Alvarez's abduction by "paid agents of the United States ' 88 violated
an extradition treaty, and Mexico had adequately objected, the Ker-
Frisbie doctrine was not applied and jurisdiction was declined. 89
E. Modern State Action Analysis and the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
A determination of whether state action has occurred is essen-
tial to an application of either the Toscanino or the violation of an
extradition treaty exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Whether a
valid Constitutional defense may be made to an illegal abduction
which violates a valid extradition treaty depends not only upon an
objection by the asylum state, but also upon whether the conduct in
question is found to have been state action. A finding of state action
is also essential to successful invocation of Toscanino due process ex-
ceptions. Given the importance of a finding of state action to any
Ker-Frisbie case, and the well-developed state action analysis used in
other "state-actor" situations, the state action analysis used in Ker
seems antiquated and inadequate. In Ker, though the U.S. govern-
ment had provided extradition papers and thereby legally authorized
a Pinkerton agent to extradite Ker to the United States, it was not
considered to be a state action when the agent used illegal means to
gain custody. Rather, the Court said that since the Pinkerton agent
kept the extradition papers "in his pocket", the abduction was not
carried out under the existing extradition treaty, and the treaty was
not violated.90 The Government takes this position in its appeal of
Judge Rafeedie's ruling.9'
88. Id. at 609.
89. Id. at 614.
90. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 443 (1886).
91. Government's Brief at II, United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D.
Cal. 1990).
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Applying the facts of Ker to modern standards, it is clear that
the Pinkerton agent today would be considered an agent of the
United States. He was sent as a messenger of the United States and
was thereby vested with legal authority for the proposed extradi-
tion.92 The U.S. Navy assisted in the abduction by transporting Ker
away from Peru.93 Though the United States itself did not employ
the Pinkerton agent, it is clear that the bank paid him to extradite
Ker under color of law.
Judge Rafeedie ruled that because the DEA induced the illegal
abduction through the offer to pay for the delivery of Dr. Alvarez,
gave the go ahead for the abduction, and paid a reward upon com-
pletion of the abduction, the United States could be charged with
the acts of the abductors. 9' Judge Rafeedie's finding of state action,
though not surprising by modern standards, is more expansive than
the notion of state action used in Ker.
The modern rule, as stated in Dr. Alvarez's case, is that where
the state, through its agents, incited, encouraged or induced private
individuals to undertake such actions with a view to benefit from
their outcome, the state is responsible.95 Ker would seem to meet this
test, because the Pinkerton agent quite obviously benefitted from the
outcome of his actions, as did the bank. Thus, if modern state action
analyses were applied to the facts of Ker, the result would be
different.
The state action analysis of Ker leaves open wide avenues for
courts to countenance illegal abductions of non-resident aliens. Is it
possible to imagine a private corporation hiring mercenaries to ab-
duct people for criminal prosecution in the United States and that
the United States would then lend them a battleship to transport the
defendants?96 It is an unlikely scenario perhaps, but the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine would allow it. Should the political climate make it profita-
ble for corporations and the executive to endorse such practices in
the name of the war on drugs, or the war on terrorism, because of
the narrow definition of state action used in the Ker-Frisbie doctrine,
U.S. courts would have to exercise jurisdiction.
State action analysis has been more fully developed in domestic
92. Lowenfeld, supra note 4 at 461.
93. Id. at 461.
94. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 608. (C.D. Cal. 1990).
95. Id. Judge Rafeedie cited Bassiouni's treatise (supra note 3) and United States v.
Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975) (state
responsibility attaches for barbarities inflicted by persons who can be characterized as paid
agents of the United States).
96. If such a scenario were possible, the $50,000 abduction fee in Dr. Alvarez's case
would not deter large companies from engaging in abductions. The publicity would be price-
less. "Exxon, doing more to clean up our hemisphere." This scenario has not yet occurred, but
it is interesting to ponder whether the United States' government would grant an extradition
request by an offended nation in such a case.
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case-law. Paid government informants have often been found to be
state actors.97 "To act 'under color' of law does not require that the
accused be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful
participant in joint activity with the State or its agents."98 If this
standard is applied to extraterritorial abductions, a state action re-
sult is clear. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., the Supreme Court
said, "Where state officials or private persons acting consciously with
state support participate in the interference with the exercise of fed-
eral rights, the interference assumes a far graver cast than it other-
wise would have, and the authority of the State is brought into con-
flict with the authority of the Constitution." 99
Adickes was a civil rights case and the federal rights in that
passage clearly refer to Constitutional rights. Yet, Mexico has rights
through an extradition treaty, which is part of the federal law. Thus,
Mexico has legally cognizable rights which have been interfered with
by persons knowingly acting with state support. The analogy serves
to buttress the reasoning of Judge Rafeedie's ruling.
Notwithstanding modern state action analysis, police and offi-
cials of other nations have not been found to constitute "paid agents
of the United States" for purposes of such analysis."' However,
when torture occurs at the hands of foreign officials acting at the
behest of American officials, the analysis shifts to one of joint ven-
ture i.e., did American officials participate enough for the action to
constitute a joint venture?101 If a joint venture is found, then absent
significant torture, the question becomes whether the offended sover-
eign has made a formal objection to the illegal abduction.102 Only
97. See, e.g., United States v. Celia, 568 F.2d 1266, 1282 (9th Cir. 1978); Matje v.
Leis, 571 F.Supp. 918, 927 (S.D. Ohio 1983). More recent case law suggests that analysis of
paid informants' actions may become more complex. "For example, it is surely relevant
whether the informant is paid a salary to infiltrate an organization full-time, or whether the
informant receives periodic payments in return for discrete acts performed." Ghandi v. Police
Department of Detroit, 823 F.2d 959, 964, n.5, (6th Cir. 1987). Note that such an analysis is
totally inconsistent with the reasoning employed in applications of modern criminal conspiracy
statutes.
98. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
99. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Company 252 F. Supp. 140 (1966). See also, Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 238 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
100. See United States v. Jordan, I M.J. 334, 438 (C.M.A. 1976) (holding that any
American participation at all makes a search a joint venture); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d
68 (2d Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975) (finding that Chilean police were not
acting as agents of the United States and that United States representatives were unaware of
an alleged twenty-day period of torture and interrogation of Lira).
101. See U.S. v. Mount, 757 F.2d 1315, 1320, n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J, arguing
that the shock the conscience standard should be inapplicable where conduct is entirely attrib-
utable to foreign officials).
102. See United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975) (Bolivian
police, paid by the United States, but not acting in their official capacity, and no objection by
Bolivia). United States v. Toro, 840 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1988). (Defendant, neither American
nor Panamanian, could not challenge District Court's jurisdiction, though his presence was
secured in derogation of an existing extradition treaty between Panama and the United States,
where neither party to the treaty objected to the abduction.)
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where such an objection is made must courts decline to exercise ju-
risdiction over the abducted person."0 3
In justifying judicial acceptance of unconstitutional behavior by
foreign officials in cases before American courts, some judges have
turned to the analogous, though discredited, silver platter doctrine.
The doctrine was developed to allow federal prosecutions of criminal
matters to use evidence obtained by state officials not constrained by
the exclusionary rule and then handed over 'on a silver platter' to
federal prosecutors who were subject to imposition of the exclusion-
ary rule. The doctrine was found to frustrate the purpose of the
fourth amendment and was discredited in Elkins v. United States in
1960.104 The discreditation of a doctrine so directly analogous to the
Ker-Frisbie rule undermines the already questionable validity of reli-
ance upon narrow joint venture constructions which discount U.S.
complicity in illegal abductions initiated, but not "participated" in,
by U.S. officials. 05
It would not be unprecedented to extend domestic state action
analysis standards to extraterritorial abductions. The court which ar-
ticulated the Toscanino exception took express notice of relevant de-
velopments in U.S. criminal jurisprudence. In Rochin v. Califor-
nia,106 the Supreme Court found that the forcible pumping of a
defendant's stomach in the pursuit of evidence was shocking to the
conscience; and so laid the foundation for the Second Circuit's
ground-breaking exception to the Ker-Frisbie rule.
IV. Alternative Theories of Dismissal: Violations of International
Law and Human Rights
While the contractarian view of the Constitution sees the prob-
103. See United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (Ist Cir. 1981) (defendant's claim of
treaty violation held invalid where neither Panama nor Venezuela objected); United States v.
Reed. 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981) (no violation of extradition treaty where Bahamian Gov-
ernment did not protest abduction of defendant); United States v. Sobell, 244 F.2d 520 (2d
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957) (Second Circuit ruling that Mexican Security
Police's delivery of defendant to DEA agents was a deportation and not chargeable to the
DEA).
104. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
105. Cf. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1419 (1989).
Professor Sullivan argues that a key insight of American constitutional law is preventing gov-
ernment from doing indirectly that which it may not do directly. A short passage does well to
illustrate her point: "When government is forbidden to provide a benefit for reasons extraneous
to any pressure on the beneficiary's rights, no unconstitutional conditions arise. For example,
government may not give away cash bounties or early prison release to those who volunteer to
eliminate suspected but untried enemies of the people. The reason has nothing to do with the
hitman's rights; it is rather that due process bars the government from taking life summarily."
Id.
106. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952). "We are compelled to conclude
that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidi-
ous squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is
conduct that shocks the conscience." Id.
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lem of illegal extraterritorial state action from the perspective of the
right-holder 1 7 and the organic view focuses only on the conduct of
the Government and its agents, international law may be said to em-
body both perspectives. On the one hand, International Law is made
by, among, and for the benefit of nations. On the other, treaties and
declarations of the United Nations and various other international
bodies do purport to create universal human rights in individuals. 0 8
Judge Rafeedie acknowledged the existence of several international
instruments designed to protect human rights, but refused to apply
them to Dr. Alvarez's case.
Significant progress has been made in establishing international
norms for state treatment of persons. Many of those norms are appli-
cable to an illegal abduction. Because physical abuse and arbitrary
detention are inherent in forcible abductions, 10 9 such abductions usu-
ally violate internationally recognized rights to personal liberty and
freedom from arbitrary detention. The .International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights states that "[e]veryone has the right to
liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as
are established by law."110 Not surprisingly, the Human Rights
Committee which implements the International Covenant has ruled
that forcible abduction for prosecution constitutes "arbitrary arrest
and detention."
Arbitrary arrest and detention are also prohibited by the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights,1 and the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights. 12 When an illegal abduction occurs, a right
to personal integrity is also violated.1 1 3 The American Convention on
Human Rights states: "[e]very person has the right to have his phys-
ical, mental, and moral integrity respected" and is protected against
"cruel inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.""1 4 The In-
107. See Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from
Kidnapping of Suspected Terrorists, 10 HuM. RTS. Q. 193 (1988).
108. As of this writing the U.S. still occupies Kuwait and portions of Southern Iraq. It
has been extremely saddening and ironic to hear the U.S. government speak of violations of
human rights in Iraq and Kuwait as justification for a military offensive while that same gov-
ernment denies the application of international human rights instruments in its own courts.
109. See, Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of Filar-
tiga, see, James Paul George, Defining Filartiga: Characterizing International Torture Claims
in United States Courts, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. I (1984).
110. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9(1), adopted Dec. 19,
1966, entered into effect Mar. 23, 1976, [hereinafter, Covenant]. The United States and China
are the only major powers which have not signed this document.
11. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 9, signed Dec. 1948, U.N.G.A.
Res. 217A. (111), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), [hereinafter, Declaration].
112. American Convention on Human Rights, article 7, signed Nov. 22 1969, entered
into force July 18, 1978, OAS Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, OAS Official Records OEA/Ser. L/
V/I1. 23 Doc. 21 Rev. 6 (1979), [hereinafter, Convention].
113. Convention, supra note 113, article 5.
114. Id.
[Vol. 9:2
THE KER-FRISBIE DOCTRINE
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 115 It further pro-
vides that "all persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person."' 116 Extraterritorial abductions are simply not consistent with
basic conceptions of human rights which have come to be almost
universally recognized.
In any case of abduction, there is violation of personal liberty, of
the right to be detained under legal authority, of the right of
emigration, of the right to remain in a state until expelled, and
of the right to seek asylum. Personal integrity is usually violated
because of the force typically required to subdue and transport
an abductee. The right to prompt review of the lawfulness of the
detention is usually violated because of the time needed to trans-
port the abductee. 17
In United States courts, legal arguments relying on human
rights have not been widely accepted. The objection which usually
arises to claims brought, or defenses raised, which are based on in-
ternational human rights is that such rights come from treaties
which are executory and which do not become law until imple-
mented by the legislature.
Because he dismissed the case against Dr. Alvarez on grounds
that his abduction violated the extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico, Judge Rafeedie did not find it necessary to reach
the issue of whether the Charter of the United Nations and the
Charter of American States were violated by Alvarez's abduction." 8
He noted however, "that while the United States' participation in
the abduction of Dr. [Alvarez] would appear to violate these interna-
tional instruments, the weight of the authority indicates that these
international instruments are not self-executing and therefore are not
enforceable in federal courts absent implementing legislation."' 9
The distinction between executory and self-executing treaties is
not well established in international or United States' law. "The is-
sue is often framed in terms of whether the treaty provisions are
sufficiently clear and definite so as to be judicially enforceable."' 1 0 In
United States courts, international human rights accords are viewed
115. Covenant, supra note 111, article 7.
116. Covenant, supra note I 11, article 10.
117. Quigley, supra note 108, at 205.
118. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 614. (C.D. Cal. 1990).
119. Id.
120. See Feinrider, Extraterritorial Abductions: Developing International Standards,
14 AKRON L. REv. 27, 45 n. 121, (1980). See e.g., Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242
P.2d 617 (1952). Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on other
grounds sub nom. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
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as executory, and their provisions do not create any rights in per-
sons. 2 ' Some courts, however, have found that international law
which rises to the level of customary law may be enforced in federal
courts.' 22 Customary international law is part of federal common
law.1 23
The executive branch of the government of the United States
has, in the past, recognized the validity of human rights. In 1979,
the United States Department of State went on record as considering
certain human rights instruments binding as customary international
law, apart from any treaty obligations:
There now exists an international consensus that recognizes ba-
sic human rights and obligations owed by all governments to
their citizens. This consensus is reflected in a growing body of
international law: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
and other international and regional human rights agreements.
There is no doubt that these rights are often violated; but virtu-
ally all governments acknowledge their validity.2
Nonetheless, U.S. courts have not often resolved the issue of ju-
risdiction in cases involving extraterritorial abductions from the
standpoint of the infringed rights of the kidnapped. 25 Despite the
importance which human rights have had in formulating U.S. for-
eign policy, 26 and the significant impact which 'American Constitu-
tionalism' has had on international human rights standards,2 7
human rights play increasingly smaller roles in American
121. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). The Government cites these cases on page 16
of its appeal.
122. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980). Judge Rafeedie noted in
his opinion that the Ninth Circuit has rejected Filartiga inasmuch as it purports to create
individual rights in U.S. courts based upon "principles of international law." United States v.
Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
123. La Pacquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). "International law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdic-
tion, as often as questions of right depending on it are duly presented for their determination."
Id.
124. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
TICES FOR 1979 (1980).
125. Quigley, supra note 108, at 196. "Courts hearing an abductee's challenge to juris-
diction in the country that conducted the forcible abduction have addressed the question as one
of possible violation of the rights of the asylum states and have typically upheld jurisdiction."
Id. Professor Quigley argues that the question should be addressed as one of violation of
human rights of the abductee, and that courts should decline jurisdiction.
126. See, Orentichler, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-
Finding, 3 HARV. H. RTS. J. 83, 86-92 (1990).
127. See generally, Lillich, The United States Constitution and Human Rights, 3
HARV. H. RTS. J. 53, 54-61 (1990).
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jurisprudence.128
V. Judicial Supervisory Power Over the Executive
Judicial supervisory power is implicated where governmental
conduct is unlawful, because the "law must not make itself an ac-
complice in willful disobedience of the law." '29 The doctrine of su-
pervisory power allows the judiciary to monitor and restrain uncon-
stitutional conduct of other branches of government. "The purposes
underlying use of supervisory powers are threefold: to implement a
remedy for the violation of recognized rights, to preserve judicial in-
tegrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considera-
tions validly before the jury, and finally, as a remedy designed to
deter illegal conduct."' 30 The latter two of those purposes would be
directly served by an exercise of supervisory power in Dr.-Alvarez's
case. Since Mexico wants Alvarez back in Mexico, the first purpose
would also be served, whether under the rights of Alvarez, or of
Mexico.
Judge Rafeedie took note that Dr. Alvarez was "but one of
three defendants named in this indictment to be brought before this
court by forcible abduction from his homeland."'' He then re-
minded the executive that fifteen years ago in Lara, Judge Oakes
had warned that
[W]e can reach a time when, in the interest of establishing and
maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence, we
may wish to bar jurisdiction in an abduction case not as a mat-
ter of constitutional law but in the exercise of our supervisory
power . . To my mind the Government in its laudable interest
in stopping the international drug traffic is by.these repeated ab-
ductions inviting exercise of that supervisory power in the inter-
est of the greater good and preserving respect for the law.132
Judge Rafeedie did not find it necessary to reach the question of
whether supervisory power would be proper in Alvarez's case.13  In-
128. Id. at 61-79.
129. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
130. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 504-05 (1983). The doctrine is sometimes
referred to as the McNabb Rule, as it was formulated in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332 (1943). See also, Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 80 (1960), and United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
131. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. 599, 615 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
132. Id. The United States, in its appeal to Judge Rafeedie's order, suggests that the
court would be resolving issues committed to the executive if it were to exercise its supervisory
power in this case. Government's Brief at 38, United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp.
599 (C.D. Cal. 1990). This mischaracterizes what is essentially a criminal procedure issue.
The same issue (outrageous government conduct toward criminal suspects) was dealt with in
Rochin, where police brutality in forcibly pumping the stomach of a suspect in order to obtain
evidence caused the court to dismiss the case.
133. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.Supp. at 615.
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deed, courts are reluctant to exercise supervisory power, and must do
so with "a view towards balancing the interests involved." 134 How-
ever, warnings to the executive branch concerning its conduct in kid-
napping criminal defendants are not unprecedented. The court in
Lujan issued a frank message to the executive branch when it se-
verely narrowed the Toscanino shocking to the conscience exception:
[T]he controls which otherwise exist to prevent illegal abduc-
tions-the financial cost of the operation, the possibility of alien-
ating other nations, and the risk that the kidnappers would be
prosecuted in a foreign territory for their offense-suggest that
the likelihood of numerous violations is not real. If this assump-
tion should, in the future, prove to be ill-founded, our conclusion
can be reconsidered.' 35
The government argues in its appeal that as the instant case is a
foreign policy matter, and has been reserved by the Constitution for
the Executive to resolve, the court overstepped its bounds in even
considering the possibility of exercising supervisory power.136 Its ap-
peal cites Baker v. Carr,3 ' where the Court recognized that cases
which turn on political questions are inappropriate for the judiciary
to decide.
Not only does resolution of such issues frequently turn on stan-
dards that defy judicial application, or involve the exercise of a
discretion demonstrably committed to the Executive or Legisla-
ture; but many such questions uniquely demand single-voiced
statement of the Government's views. 38
Such a statement might seem to resolve the issue of a Court's
exercise of supervisory power in Dr. Alvarez's case. However, later
in Carr the Court specifically distinguished between cases which
turn on political questions and cases which are merely political. "The
doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions' not one of
'political cases.' The courts cannot reject as 'no law suit' a bona fide
controversy as to whether some actions denominated 'political' ex-
ceed constitutional authority."' 39 Thus, had Judge Rafeedie chosen
to exercise supervisory power, the propriety of his decision would
have depended upon whether actions attributable to the Government
in Dr. Alvarez's case exceeded constitutional authority.
Ample authority supports the exercise of supervisory power in
134. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
135. United States ex re Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1983). Dr. Alvarez's
case suggests that these assumptions were in fact unfounded.
136. Government's Brief at 38, United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D.
Cal. 1990).
137. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); cited in Government's Brief on Appeal. p. 42.
138. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
139. Id. at 217.
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Dr. Alvarez's case. Six years after it decided Ker and Rauscher, the
Supreme Court said that
[w]ithout the clear authority of a law of Congress, the executive
can never, by determining a so-called political question, or by
construing an act of Congress or a treaty, conclude the rights of
persons or property, under the protection of the Constitution and
the laws of the United States, or [preclude] the courts of the
United States, in a determination of these rights.140
As recently as 1983 the Supreme Court said that, "in the exercise of
its supervisory powers, a federal court may, within limits, formulate
procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or Con-
gress.' 41 Courts clearly have the power to monitor and limit the
conduct of the executive. It would be unfortunate if the judiciary
were to duck the questionable validity of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine by
using the political question doctrine to allow the executive to deter-
mine what is, or is not, subject to judicial review.
The most likely course of the current Supreme Court would
seem to be the contractarian analysis applied in Verdugo-Urquidez.
Such an analysis would not only preclude Dr. Alvarez and others
from asserting due process claims, it would foreclose any discussion
of a supervisory role for the judiciary in the extra-national "appre-
hension" of criminal suspects. This would effectively unfetter the
power of the executive to conduct a world-wide war on drugs, or any
other subjective threat to national security, without respect for sover-
eign powers, international agreements, or objective constitutional
standards of governmental conduct. A vast and dark "forest" would
be created, completely insulated from the constitutional standards
which normally constrain American state action.
VI. Conclusion
Justice Brandeis wrote in 1928, that
[d]ecency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands to the citizen. In a government of laws, existence of the
government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scru-
pulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that
in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
140. In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 499-500 (1892).
141. United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983).
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means - to declare that the Government may commit crimes in
order to secure the conviction of a private criminal - would bring
terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court
should resolutely set its face. 142
The Ker-Frisbie doctrine is based upon antiquated and disinge-
nous standards of state action analysis. The blind eye it turns to gov-
ernment-sponsored abuses abroad is contemptuous for the human
rights of foreign nationals and the sovereignty of other nations. Its
application degrades the judiciary and may endanger a separation of
powers which has already been made tenuous by the malleable "po-
litical question" doctrine.
The government's attempt to justify its intrusions and crimes in
Mexico and other nations as technically legal does not support its
laudable efforts elsewhere to make respect for international human
rights universal among modern states. As incredibly dominant as
American military force has proven to be in the Persian Gulf, so
must the judiciary take incredible care in its vigilance of the princi-
ples by which we apply our force.
The wars on drugs and terrorism have obviated established prin-
ciples of constitutional law, and the judiciary, with a few significant
exceptions, has given its blessing. Any act will ultimately affect the
actor as well as the acted-upon, whatever the identity of the suspect/
victim. As courts become familiar with the legal rationale for ac-
cepting criminal suspects who have been brutalized by state agents
abroad, they are liable to import those rationales to cases which oc-
cur at home. The constitution and the spirit of the nation will both
suffer sadly. A quote from Sir Thomas Moore is singularly apposite
to this discussion: "This country's planted thick with laws from coast
to coast - man's laws, not God's - and if you cut them down...
do you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would
blow?1
1 43
The suggestion by the government in this case that "political
questions" such as Dr. Alvarez's are not proper for the courts to
consider is frightening. If the judiciary is not able to check govern-
mental conduct abroad, the executive will cease to consider means
and focus merely on ends. In the case of Dr. Humberto Alvarez
Machain, the government's zeal to bring to justice those responsible
for the murder of agent Camarena has had the ironic effect of flout-
ing the rule of law for which he died. It has frustrated the coopera-
tion between nations that Camarena worked to foster. The most pru-
dent course would seem to be the consistent path which respects the
142. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (1928).
143. R. Bolt, A Man For All Seasons, Act I, in THREE PLAYS 147 (L. Heineman, ed.
1967).
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rule of law of sovereign nations, the agreements which have been
crafted between nations, and the principles by which the state has
been traditionally bound as the government and the law have devel-
oped in this country.
It is sincerely hoped that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine will be ex-
cepted in Dr. Alvarez's case, if not because of concern for interna-
tional human rights, or for maintaining constitutional governmental
conduct abroad, then at least because of the treaty obligations which
were the basis of Judge Rafeedie's courageous and circumspect
decision.
H. Moss Crystle

